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Crises have long been used as a motor of European integration (Jo, 2007). ‘Europe 
will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of solutions adopted for these crises’, pronounced 
Jean Monnet to highlight the importance of crises in shaping policy change. Most narratives 
have focused on how periods of turbulence are used as opportunities to overcome old enmities 
and political opposition to change policies and institutions (Kühnhardt, 2009). However, 
crises can also be occasions for decline. Leaders may not draw the ‘right’ lessons and may 
ultimately create institutions that fail to adequately address the causes and effects of the crisis. 
What factors explain the institutional reforms observed during the Europe’s financial crisis? 
Institutions are defined as formal and informal rules of behaviour that govern EU 
macroeconomic and monetary stability.  
We amend and clarify the argument put forth by Salines et al. (2011) to explain 
institutional resilience and change under crisis conditions. We use the typology of changes 
proposed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) – layering and displacement – and clarify the 
mechanisms of institutional ‘reproduction’ hypothesized by Lindner (2003) – bargaining 
power and interdependence among policy sub-fields. Two episodes are analysed to explain 
institutional change, taking into account both external and internal shocks: the onset and 
mutation of the Irish banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis (2008-2012) and the sovereign 
debt crisis in Greece (2009-2012). We argue that despite similar institutional settings within 
the Eurozone, tackling the financial crisis has produced divergent results. On a theoretical 
level, our contribution links mechanisms to particular outcomes, specifying the conditions 
under which institutional change may occur. On a policy level, evidence shows that 
institutional innovation was helpful in Ireland: increased bargaining power of the anti-change 
coalition and fewer feedback interactions (lower interdependence) led to layering as a 
mechanism for change. Lower bargaining power of the Greek anti-change coalition and 
higher interdependence led to institutional displacement, which, under pressure by 
supranational actors, had disastrous effects. 
 Change has increased tension between member states and international institutions 
and between EU voters and global investors. Has Europe’s financial crisis been an 
opportunity to propel Europe forward as political leaders often remark, or is it a case of 
missed chances that collectively have failed to impress voters and investors alike? The chapter 
amends theories of institutional change and questions the capacity of institutions as 
instruments of regional governance to shield their members’ economies or respond effectively 
to external or internal shocks. Despite supplying substantial expertise and resources, 
regionally formulated innovations disturb domestic political coalitions and may provoke 
legitimation crises that end up exacerbating the very crises they are supposed to address. 
 
4.1 Institutional Stability and Change 
In an insightful essay, Salines et al. (2011) use institutional analysis to trace the evolution of 
EMU. Arguing that despite the current crisis, EMU is more likely to change through small, 
incremental changes rather than a complete reform through a ‘clean slate’ approach, they link 
the various institutional changes observed since 1999 to mechanisms of institutional change. 
After dividing the time frame into periods of stability (1999-2007) and crisis (2007-2010) 
they identify the changes that have occurred. They claim that the onset of the financial crisis 
has changed the dynamics of institutional development by accelerating the pace of change.  
 While their argument’s insight lies in linking institutional changes to mechanisms 
within EMU, we take it several steps forward to further clarify and improve it. First, using the 
same theoretical approach, we posit links between specific mechanisms and changes. They 
leave this area unexplored. They, too, employ Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) typology of 
institutional changes to categorize specific changes observed in EMU and Lindner’s (2003) 
mechanisms to explain the changes. We partially replicate their analysis and hypothesize there 
are specific mechanisms that make some changes possible but not others. 
Second, their approach is similar to ours but their research question is not. They use 
institutional structure as a mediating variable to ‘condition the crisis response’ and ‘shape 
national interests to the benefit of the common European interest’ (Salines et al. 2011, p. 7). 
Instead, we use changes in structure as a dependent variable. Concepts such as national 
preferences, bargaining power, and opportunity costs are treated as independent variables (see 
below). 
Third, we gain more analytical traction by focusing only on change under conditions 
of crisis. In other words, we conceptualize the dynamics of change under temporal, political, 
and economic pressure caused by external and internal factors. Crises loosen the grip of 
dominant coalitions onto institutional outcomes by forcing a re-examination of the latter’s 
structure and effectiveness. Change will not necessarily be the final outcome, but change will 
necessarily be on the agenda. As Gourevitch (1986, p. 17) observes, in hard economic times 
the ‘comfortable illusion’ of economic growth and prosperity disintegrates, producing 
reflection, political conflict, and change. The inadequacies of regional governance will be 
more obvious during crises likely leading to more observable and measurable institutional 
change. Crises open policy windows for change (Keeler 1993; Zahariadis 2003). They 
empower alternative coalitions to frame problems in different ways and push for innovative 
solutions that would be less likely during periods of economic prosperity. 
  
4.2 Linking Mechanisms to Institutional Change 
Which factors explain the observed institutional change in EMU during the crisis years 2008-
2012? We use the typology proposed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Lindner’s (2003) 
mechanisms of change to link specific changes to particular mechanisms. Overall we 
postulate two hypotheses:  
H1: Increasing bargaining power of the anti-change coalition leads to layering. 
H2: Higher interdependence between policy sub-fields leads to displacement. 
We probe their validity in two cases within two national contexts: Ireland and Greece.  
We decided to drop Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) redirection, depletion, and drift as 
categories of change for four reasons. First, brevity and analytical traction prevent a thorough 
investigation when the dependent variable takes so many values. Second, we view layering 
and redirection as somewhat equivalent types of changes. We understand that layering 
involves the creation of new institutions (see below) while redirection simply re-orients 
existing institutions but re-orientation alters the costs and benefits of current institutional 
arrangements and almost always leads to new configurations which involve marginally novel 
institutions. Third, depletion, which is defined as withering away of the institution, is clearly 
not the case in the EMU context; so from a methodological point of view we could not 
ascertain any mechanism of change. Fourth, drift is conceptualized in Mahoney and Thelen as 
a case where current institutional structures are overwhelmed by external shocks. Therefore, 
change results as institutions drift away from their original purpose toward a more stable and 
effective equilibrium. We believe drift spans many examples of change. In fact, we 
conceptualize it as a pre-cursor to change in all our examples. Pressures building in favour of 
change must first show why the current system is unable to cope under present structures, 
essentially calling for demonstrating the presence of drift.  
We also drop Lindner’s (2003) third mechanism of switching costs and fourth 
mechanism of accommodating pressure for change through minor adaptations for two 
reasons. First, we believe institutional change is likely to come as a result of failing to 
accommodate pressures through minor adaptations. This does not mean it cannot come in big, 
sudden reforms but minor adaptations are very difficult to measure as distinct from layering, 
which may involve minor innovations, or displacement, which reveals increased, gradual 
salience of one aspect of the system over time. Second, switching costs are almost always 
correlated with shifts in bargaining power because the desire to switch from one institutional 
venue to the other implies more bargaining power in the new environment. Therefore, the 
question of switching to a different institutional configuration must take into account possible 
future shifts in the distribution of costs and benefits. 
To aid the process of replication, we re-examine many of the examples cited in Salines 
et al. (2011). We analyse the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and its 
predecessor, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), as examples of layering. We 
explore the salience of the European Commission during bank bailouts (and its relative 
absence during the sovereign debt crisis) and the infusion of liquidity through the ECB’s 
Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) as examples of displacement.  
The dependent variable is institutional change and it comes in two forms (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010). Layering is a change which involves a renegotiation of institutional 
arrangements where new institutions are developed and added on top of existing ones. In this 
way, participants may protect their institutional sunk costs and still allow for partial 
exploration of new ways to deal with old or new problems. The current distribution of costs 
and benefits is altered in significant ways to reflect the new distribution of power across 
institutional actors. Applied to the EMU context, this change may be witnessed by the 
addition of a permanent fund such as the ESM on top of the temporary EFSF. Displacement 
takes place when one element of the institutional structure gains prominence over others. 
Such change takes place when the level of discretion in interpretation is high. The ECB 
provides an interesting case of displacement because its role has been very prominent during 
the crisis since 2008. It has (reluctantly in some instances) sought to ensure proper 
transmission of monetary policy and has adopted a more salient role in providing liquidity and 
conducting bank stress tests to restore credibility in Europe’s banking system.  
Viewing change as the absence of stability, Lindner (2003) elaborates on two 
mechanisms of institutional stability, what he terms reproduction. A breakdown in those 
mechanisms produces institutional change. He specifies the following independent variables: 
 the bargaining power differential between the dominant coalition and the 
change coalition, and 
 spill-over effects and the presence of supranational entrepreneurs. 
Each variable is linked to a distinct mechanism. We improve on his argument by showing that 
each variable leads to a specific kind of change. The first independent variable provides the 
logic for change in producing layering. The second supplies the logic of the mechanism 
producing displacement. 
 
Bargaining Power 
Institutional change alters the cost/benefit ratio of current institutional arrangements. 
Any change must either increase or decrease the ratio relative to the status quo; otherwise 
actors would not expend political capital trying to change things. Changes may be brought by 
increases or decreases in bargaining power. Such power differentials arise because of external 
or internal factors, but in either instance such factors create dynamics that privilege some 
governments and downgrade others. For example, exogenous factors such as the economic 
crisis may weaken the ability of a powerful member within the SGP if that member also leads 
a dominant coalition which opposes strict enforcement of the rules. If members accumulate 
debt as a result of the crisis, or if their debt servicing capacity comes under attack by market 
actors, the ability of that government to sustain lax enforcement rules of SGP-defined 
sanctions is weakened. Deteriorating finances over a period of time would lead to more 
gradual though equally perceptible shift in power. In contrast, governments that are able to 
improve their finances are in a better position to make their voices heard. Germany is a good 
example of a country whose finances have improved over time (even during the crisis years) 
to give it even more leverage than it previously had over SGP changes. German 2-year 
sovereign bond yields recently dropped to negative 0.012 per cent (though have since gone 
up), while 10-year bond yields hovered around 1.32 per cent. In contrast, Spain’s 10-year 
yield rose to 6.5 per cent and Italy’s yield rose to 5.73 per cent (Goodman and Jenkins 2012). 
All this implies there are financial winners and losers in the crisis whose bargaining power 
shifts accordingly.  
We assume depletion is not an option and membership among change agents overlaps 
with status quo agents. Under such conditions, changes in bargaining power are more likely to 
coincide with institutional redirection. The reason is two-fold. First, the status quo coalition 
will try to fend off any changes even as its power is eroded from within. The end result is 
defection of some members at the margins. The idea is that shifts in bargaining power will not 
be wholesale but relatively small. Because agents are efficient users, political capital will be 
spent trying to reform existing arrangements rather than completely redesign them. This leads 
us to the second reason. Changes imply uncertainty. If members of the status quo coalition are 
implicated in the pro-change movement, the cost of overcoming the status quo may be greater 
than the cost of redirecting objectives to better serve the new status quo membership. In the 
latter case, the defection of one or two members may be sufficient to tip the balance in favour 
of a new cost/benefit distribution with minimal cost. We measure bargaining power by 
reference to creditor versus debtor countries. The lower the public debt, budget deficits, and 
bond yields of sovereigns, the greater their bargaining power is likely to be.   
 
4.3 Spill-over and Supranational Entrepreneurs 
When institutional stability hinges on interdependence among policy sub-fields, any 
accumulated externalities may tip the balance by leading to more costs or benefits in one field 
rather than another. Actors accustomed to the status quo may view this as upsetting the 
balance and may therefore change institutional configurations to recalibrate costs and 
benefits. In other words, spill-over effects might cause reassessment of costs or benefits in 
ways that require a new coalition to redistribute costs and benefits. Lindner (2003) argues this 
is done in the presence of supranational entrepreneurs. When veto players are strong and 
discretion of rule interpretation is high, current institutional arrangements are easier to 
reconfigure to take into account new realities. New institutions are unlikely to be created 
because veto players do not want to see dramatic change. However, some actors might 
acquire new salience because they are deemed capable of responding to challenges within the 
current institutional configuration. The higher the level of interdependence, the greater the 
likelihood will be of damaging effects spilling over across national borders. More spill-overs 
generate the need for greater coordination, making the involvement of a supranational 
entrepreneur more likely and thereby increasing its salience.  
Supranational actors might take an interest in an issue that was not previously under 
their prerogative (displacement) for three reasons. First, higher interdependence under crisis 
conditions maximizes spill-overs and cascading effects (Zahariadis, 2012). In this case, 
supranational entrepreneurs are activated to build coalitions for change. Second, a 
supranational actor may have superior overall powers that eclipse the powers of any single 
actor. The ECB, for instance, has monetary power and an overall European perspective that 
eclipses that of any government. Third, when there is acute conflict among participants, the 
supranational actor might be the only actor most members can agree to take up the issue. 
Existing supranational actors already have legitimacy of action. In this sense, cooperation via 
the presence of the ECB is enhanced when there is a credible supranational authority to 
mitigate and adjudicate costs and benefits in ways that individual national actors cannot. We 
measure interdependence by the degree of cross-national holdings of debt. Consequently, 
increased salience is uncovered by supranational actors undertaking activities they did not 
previously do in ways that EMU participants had not deemed important. 
Though not addressing institutional change, von Hagen’s (2009) work illuminates the 
difference between the two mechanisms. Cooperation among states under EMU rests on 
addressing two fundamental conflicts. The horizontal conflict arises from the uneven 
distribution of costs and benefits among EMU members. The vertical conflict stems from the 
possible abuse of resources and/or political power by either member states or the institutional 
centre of the Union. EMU rests on the ability to fine tune the balance between the two. Crises 
upset this balance and may lead to institutional changes that either make the distribution of 
costs and benefits even more uneven, and therefore, politically unacceptable or prevent abuses 
by stressing centralized power.  
In essence, cooperation, according to von Hagen, is the ability of each member to 
incentivize the willingness to come together against the propensity to defect. If member 
governments believe they will gain from increased cooperation under EMU, they will likely 
accept the current distribution of costs and benefits despite its unevenness. If they believe they 
will  benefit from defecting, i.e., deviating from agreed norms, they will attempt to change 
course. At times, the question is to make deviation so costly as not to pursue it. At other 
times, the main question is how to distribute benefits and costs more evenly. The end result is 
a zero-sum situation where a more even distribution of costs and benefits leads to 
decentralization of power increasing the possibility of deviation and abuses. In contrast, 
increasing the cost of deviation creates the possibility of a more uneven distribution ratio.  
 
4.4 EMU’s Institutional Design 
At its core, Europe’s financial crisis since 2008 has brought back to the surface a political 
controversy that surrounds the design of EMU. Viewed as a collective action dilemma, a 
delicate compromise was crafted in the Treaty of Maastricht to accommodate national 
preferences to design a monetary system that would bring about the economic benefits of 
monetary integration without dealing with some of the political difficulties that surround the 
loss of national sovereignty implied by integration (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Instead, 
the system was designed with several coordinating functions and soft modes of governance, 
such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), to prevent the likelihood of free riding and/or 
abuses by national governments. It essentially decoupled EMU from political union (Jones 
2002; Padoa-Schiopa 2004) leading scholars to argue for few spill-over effects, conflict, or 
disintegration (Enderlein and Verdun 2009). Indeed, Verdun (2000) argued the compromise 
was the result of no appetite for further integration on the part of national governments, 
essentially leaving a crisis as the only way to make the next steps desirable or acceptable. 
Despite increased criticism of various design flaws (e.g., De Grauwe 2006; Heise 2008), the 
system performed remarkably well for several years (Hodson 2009; Verdun 2010). 
EMU has two major goals (European Commission 2012):  
 to provide price stability through a sound, integrated monetary policy; and  
 to create an environment fostering higher economic growth and more employment. 
Apart from the obvious instrument of creating a single currency, EMU tried to accomplish 
these goals by creating an independent central bank and coordinating fiscal and economic 
policies among member states. Governing the EMU system are several EU and national 
institutions. But it soon became apparent the system would run into trouble unless certain 
precautions were taken to deal with problems of collective action. The two main ones were 
shielding the central bank from political pressures to monetize national fiscal deficits and 
holding countries responsible for their own financial management. As a study from Deutsche 
Bank Research (2011) asserts, ‘To achieve the first objective, the ECB was prohibited to 
purchase government bonds in the primary market and given far reaching independence in the 
Maastricht Treaty that constituted EMU. To achieve the second objective, the Stability and 
Growth Pact was concluded with the aim to prevent [and discipline] governments from 
running up excessive fiscal deficits’. Despite reforming the SGP in 2005 to tailor the rules to 
specific national demands (Howarth, 2007) the system proved remarkably resilient and 
stabilizing (Hodson 2009). But beginning in 2008, things began to change.  
What factors explain the institutional changes observed in Europe during the financial 
crisis since 2008? We look at the effects of the banking crisis that first occurred in Ireland, 
and then turn our attention to the sovereign debt crisis, which first started in Greece. 
 
4.5 Ireland and the Banking System’s Meltdown 
The case of Ireland contains a paradox. Despite the country’s exemplary economic 
performance prior to 2007 and its ability to sustain low public debt and even record fiscal 
surpluses since its entry in the Eurozone (McCarthy, 2012), Ireland was forced into an 
EU/International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity program.  In fact, Ireland was always 
performing well within the SGP agreed at the Eurozone level. The Irish problem was not due 
to the structural design of the Euro as a common currency, but rather to the exposure of Irish 
private banks to toxic assets as well as the reckless lending practices of its national banking 
system. It was the global financial crisis that sparked with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
in 2008 that sharpened the focus on Irish bank debt. EMU proved institutionally, politically, 
and economically unable to shield the national economy from impending catastrophe. In order 
for the banks to stay afloat the government was forced to undertake this private debt 
transferring it to the general public. Hence, the private banking meltdown mutated into a 
sovereign debt crisis. The presence of EMU simply regionalized Ireland’s problem. 
 On 28 November 2010, the Irish government requested and received financial 
assistance to cover €85 billion in the coming three years, through the newly created EFSF 
mechanism. Albeit a landmark decision for the success of the EFSF, it was also a significant 
test for the new institutional architecture of the Eurozone and whether the application of this 
mechanism brought some stability to the Irish economy.  
 The Irish problem began towards the end of 2008 when the Irish government 
introduced a guarantee scheme to cover six of the bigger banks in the country of €400bn. This 
scheme included the troubled Anglo Irish Bank which on 21 December was recapitalized by 
the government with €1.5bn. Amidst plummeting shares, the government nationalized the 
bank later in January 2009 (Honohan, 2009). Amidst strong allegations of fraudulent activities 
and risky stock deals, the headquarters of the bank were raided by investigators in February 
2009 and by the end of March 2010 the bank reported a corporate loss of €12.7bn, the biggest 
in Irish history (Honohan, 2010). At the same time, the government, responding to the global 
financial downturn, produced a budget with projected savings of €4bn and initiated measures 
to cut public expenditure by increasing pension age by one year in the public sector by the end 
of 2009. Despite the nationalization of Anglo Irish Bank, the bank continued to report losses 
to the tune of €8.2bn by June 2010 (Clarke and Hardiman, 2012). By the end of the summer, 
all major rating agencies had cut Ireland’s creditworthiness with negative outlook. In 
September 2010, the government initiated a new round of bailing out Anglo Irish alongside 
two more banking institutions, Allied Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide. Ultimately, the new 
bank bailout cost the government dearly as it raised the budget deficit to 32% of GDP (Lane 
2011, p. 69). 
 After the EU Summit of 29 October, Germany’s reaction to the restructuring of 
Eurozone debt pushed the government’s bond spreads – the difference between yields in Irish 
bonds and the benchmark German bonds – to 6.65% (11 November 2010) making borrowing 
for the Irish government impossible. According to the Wall Street Journal, the Irish Finance 
Minister Brian Lenihan recommended to his government that the country should formally 
request a bailout package from its European partners and the IMF, since the liquidity of the 
Irish state was reduced due to the high costs of the bailout of the banking system. Taoiseach 
Brian Cowen made the announcement on 21 November 2010. The problem then transformed 
from being a private sector inability to finance toxic assets to an inability of the government 
to bail out the country’s financial sector. The problem itself was quite simple; it involved 
tackling the private debt and containing the underwriting of the government’s debt. Yet in 
order, to achieve more savings, the government had to implement tough austerity measures. 
Failing to contain outrage from politicians and voters alike about using public funds to 
finance private follies, the Irish Government was shocked by the withdrawal from the 
coalition of the Green Party which caused general elections to be called earlier than expected. 
In February’s general election a coalition between Fine Gael and the Labour Party replaced 
the Cowen administration, under the promise of renegotiation of the bailout terms and an 
alternative to the submission to foreign lenders.  
 The new coalition continued to receive negative outlooks for its economic plans and 
therefore was forced to maintain the same austerity route, establishing essentially a pro-
stability attitude, and quickly signed off to the new austerity cuts throughout 2011 and 2012. 
It broke its campaign promises quickly leading to more protests due to new property taxes, 
university fee increases and others, while Taoiseach Enda Kenny refused to admit that Ireland 
would need a second bailout package from three international lenders, collectively known as 
the Troika – the European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF (McDonald 2012). According 
to our argument, the new government in Ireland changed overnight from a pro-change actor 
(i.e. following an alternative, a different route) to an anti-change coalition meaning that it 
chose to follow the path of stability that the proposed austerity measures and bailout packages 
entailed. Therefore, it was forced to support the institutional framework the EU proposed 
through the EFSF. The institutional innovation offered by the EU seemed appropriate for 
Ireland: the new government, despite the rough start, agreed to new financial mechanisms and 
surveillance dictated by external lenders; the problem was relatively simple and 
interdependence was low. Hence it was layering that worked as a mechanism for institutional 
change rather than displacement. 
 
4.6 Greece and the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
It is quite interesting to compare the Irish bailout agreement and austerity package with the 
one of Greece, as the two cases present us with differences that can help explain which 
mechanism produced what change in the Eurozone’s new institutional architecture. The Greek 
sovereign debt crisis involved high public debt that followed a long period of cheap 
borrowing by a highly corrupt and clientelistic state that utilized money to fulfil electoral 
promises rather than create sustainable growth and investment (Manolopoulos, 2011). At the 
same time, when Greece first sought external help to tackle its debt, there was no institutional 
framework or prior experience with confronting such issues. Hence Greece was tiptoeing on a 
stretched cable without a safety net. The EFSF was launched in June 2010, whereas the Greek 
Prime Minister requested assistance on 23 April 2010.  
Tracing back the case study not from the time of Papandreou’s assumption of office in 
November 2009, but rather from the point when financing the Greek state became 
unsustainable without external help, we can identify the key junctions that lead to further 
complications in the austerity programme. The problem for Greece was quite different from 
that of Ireland as the banking sector was not initially affected by the global financial crisis, in 
the sense that Greek private banks had minimal exposure to toxic assets. Yet, the public sector 
was on the verge of collapse; there simply was not enough money to finance services, 
operations, salaries and pensions without external borrowing. As George Papakonstantinou, 
then finance minister starkly claimed: ‘In less than two weeks, a 9 billion-euro bond comes 
due and the state coffers don’t have this money’; borrowing from foreign markets was 
prohibitively expensive so the only option was to accept the rescue plan (quoted in 
Featherstone 2011, p. 203).  The Greek Prime Minister initiated but slowly implemented some 
reforms, securing a first deal with the EU and the IMF in exchange for further budget cuts. 
Amidst growing public opposition the Greek parliament approved the austerity measures 
accompanying the bailout package on 6 May 2010. At the same time, the plan raised 
questions of accountability. Not only did it prompt blame (Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou and 
Exadaktylos, 2014) and recriminations domestically but because the terms were agreed in 
principle by the government without a vote, questions arose of sovereign economic 
governance (Chrysogonos, 2010). 
 From that moment on, the government grudgingly capitulated to international lender 
demands. However, Greece was plagued by failed reforms because of strong opposition by 
several of the government’s own party members, the social partners and various social groups. 
Despite herculean efforts to streamline public finances – in 2010 Greece accomplished the 
highest reduction in general government deficit in the Eurozone by 5 percent of GDP – the 
government simply came up short (IMF 2011). Austerity bred more austerity, and despite a 
feeble attempt to commence a privatization programme worth €50 billion, rating agencies 
continued to lower Greek creditworthiness which reached the lowest rating in the world by 
June 2011. It is interesting to note the Greek bailout remained outside the new EFSF 
institutional architecture although it, too, was funded by bilateral and multilateral loans and 
guarantees.   
 The government was desperately trying to stick to the plan even after going through a 
reshuffling of the cabinet and a vote of confidence in favour of a revised but harsh five-year 
austerity plan. Yet, this was not enough to calm Greek nerves or bring back credibility and 
financial stability, forcing the Greek government to seek a second rescue package that would 
now involve losses by private bond holders. A major precondition of this package was 
adoption of a restructured austerity programme passed in May 2011. 
 Amidst violent protests the government approved more austerity measures in a variety 
of policy areas while by the end of October 2011 a new plan was drafted in an EU summit 
with a 50% haircut of privately-held Greek debt. The new set of loans as part of the second 
package shifted to the new EFSF mechanism alongside €34.4 billion remaining from the 
previous Greek Loan Facility spread in instalments and pending reform progress. The ruling 
socialist party was unable to sustain a pro-stability coalition in parliament and was forced to 
enter into a coalition government with two neoliberal opposition parties, effectively replacing 
Papandreou as the prime minister and appointing the technocrat, former ECB vice-president, 
Lucas Papademos in November 2011.  
 The specific mandate of the coalition government was to adhere to the reforms and 
measures spelled out in the new bailout package, negotiate and complete the haircut of debt 
held by private sector bondholders, pass through parliament the austerity budget for 2012 and 
generate primary surpluses to tackle the deficit. Despite the honest efforts of the new 
government as well as the newly installed financial arsenal at the EU level, Greek 
macroeconomic conditions and outlook worsened in the last few months of 2011 (Manifava, 
2012), improved somewhat in the beginning of 2012, and crashed again in April-June as a 
result of elections and political instability (Tsolis, 2012). In a perilous game of negotiations 
among social partners and pressure by external lenders who threatened to withhold the bailout 
instalments unless specific conditions were met, the Greek parliament ratified further austerity 
measures. After finalizing the haircut and negotiating the bailout package, parliament was 
dissolved and new elections were held on 6 May 2012. Because they produced no clear 
winner or the possibility of a ruling coalition, fresh general elections were called for 17 June 
2012, bringing to power three coalition partners: the conservative New Democracy, the 
Socialists, and the newly established Democratic Left.  
 There were two problems operating at both the Greek and EU levels (Zahariadis, 
2013). First, there was no clearly identified sector that was problematic. All financial 
problems (private or public) were tied to the structural deficits of the Greek state and the 
inability of the Greek government to carry out many agreed-upon reforms. Therefore, the 
degree of problem interdependence was quite high. Second, confronted with a unique problem 
and in light of previous experience with loose interpretation of Eurozone rules and lack of 
consequences, Greece’s partners proved unable to react promptly. They had no prior 
experience with tackling such a complex issue within the established institutional architecture 
of the common currency area. The solution agreed between the Greek government and the 
Troika predated any serious attempt to tackle the sizable sovereign debt of many Eurozone 
countries. The Greek government had to confront a rather strong pro-change (i.e., against 
austerity) coalition formed by domestic political parties, competing social groups as well as 
internal factions within the governing party. In this way, the decreasing bargaining power of 
the anti-change (pro-stability) coalition failed to build on the existing institutions of the 
Eurozone, effectively failing to promote institutional change within the country and take 
ownership of the austerity programme. 
 By the end of the period, Troika demands took precedence over the necessities and 
preferences of the Greek state and society. The lack of domestic consensus and the strong 
pressures from abroad forced a mechanism of displacement to be triggered leading to (a) a 
new bailout package in March 2012 and (b) more importantly to even greater financial, 
political and social instability. Confirming our hypothesis, higher interdependence between 
policy subfields in Greece led to institutional change characterized by displacement rather 
than layering. 
 
Concluding remarks 
What factors explain the institutional reforms observed during Europe’s financial crisis? 
Drawing on work from Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Lindner (2003), we assessed the 
empirical viability of two hypotheses: (1) increasing bargaining power of the anti-change 
coalition leads to layering; and (2) higher interdependence between policy sub-fields leads to 
displacement. They were tested through the Greek and Irish bailout packages to explain 
differences in the challenges they presented to the institutional architecture of the common 
currency area. From an institutional perspective we build upon and contribute to conceptual 
linkages of specific mechanisms to particular types of institutional change. Amending 
Mahoney and Thelen we show their taxonomy can also be used to explain crisis-driven, short-
term institutional change. But not all change is necessarily productive or appropriate.  
Despite similar institutional settings within the Eurozone, tackling the financial crisis 
in Greece and Ireland has produced thus far divergent results. We found that the bailout 
arrangement was quite appropriate for Ireland, but the one agreed for Greece was not. Crises 
challenge this EMU presumption in two ways. First, the decoupling of economic and 
monetary union is strongly contested. Second, efforts to address one set of problems end up 
exacerbating others (Zahariadis, 2012). The point is that crises may lead to institutional 
innovations, but these innovations will not always be productive. Leaders may not draw the 
right lessons, especially in regards to Greece, because of the huge interdependence between 
sub-fields. In other words, a simple solution was applied to a very complex problem. It 
worked for Ireland but it failed for Greece, given that Ireland's problem was less complex, and 
it involved a prior history of fiscal discipline and restructuring of the state. 
The case studies demonstrate that institutional innovation put forward by the European 
partners and the IMF was appropriate for Ireland: the anti-change coalition—despite coming 
to power under the platform of renegotiating austerity—succumbed to the new financial 
mechanisms and the tacit consensus gaining increased bargaining power over the pro-change 
(anti-austerity) partners. The problem of the Irish state was staying afloat and tackling 
liquidity drought due to the undertaking of the private bank debt – nothing more. Thus, the 
reduced complexity of the issues at stake was not sufficient to trigger displacement; rather 
institutional layering worked well as a mechanism for change.  
In contrast, there was no political consensus in Greece largely because there was no 
consensus on what precisely the problem was and who was to blame (Vasilopoulou, 
Halikiopoulou and Exadaktylos, 2014. The government faced strong opposition by (a) the 
political parties in parliament, (b) the social partners affected by the institutional change and 
(c) by its own parliamentarians and ministers. Therefore, any bargaining power of the anti-
change players was diminished. The Greek government could not put its own stamp on reform 
programmes (layering). At the same time, Greece’s problem was a lot more complex than 
simple government debt. Given the high interdependence amongst policy subfields, the new 
externally imposed institutional architecture took prominence under the pressure of 
supranational actors, leading to disastrous implementation and intensifying instability in 
financial, political and social terms.  Essentially, displacement shifted the process and 
direction of change for Greece, but at the end of the day there was little consensus as to what 
that direction was or should be. Increased confusion and resistance to change coupled with 
strong-arm tactics by external lenders created a toxic political environment that decisively 
lowered the effectiveness of these institutional innovations. 
Crises have proven fertile ground to construct new institutions of governance in the 
EU. Our study echoes the observation made by van den Noord et al (2008, p. 63) that ‘the 
governance structure in EMU builds on a strong tradition of subsidiarity, which leaves policy 
responsibilities to the Member States wherever this is feasible’. The institutional rules of SGP 
as well as initial EU responses to the financial crisis clearly demonstrate the willingness of 
national governments to solve (unsuccessfully) their problems and the reluctance of EU actors 
and other governments to intervene robustly to fix those problems. However, the study also 
shows the limits of collective responses to national problems. Article 121 of TFEU views 
economic policy as a matter of common concern and coordination. Nevertheless, the ability to 
address economic problems is limited by national concerns and political timetables as 
demonstrated by the ‘no-bail out clause’ (Article 125 of TFEU). As a result, similar 
institutional innovations are used to generate solutions to quite diverse problems. The Fiscal 
Compact and the nascent (and still feeble) banking union further illustrate the benefits of 
regional institutional changes undermined by national preferences and bargaining power 
(Dehousse, 2012; Frankel, 2013; Fox, 2013). EMU was originally conceived as an 
institutional innovation that would bring financial stability and growth to European economies 
in light of increasing globalization. However, this pooling of economic risk also masked 
growing complications in dealing with systemic crises; national problems easily overwhelmed 
national capacities and became systemic problems. Responses addressed some problems 
reasonably well (Ireland) while leaving several problems with Greece unresolved while not 
effectively addressing deeper structural issues with financial institutions. 
Some national governments consider more European integration as the solution to 
issues of size. Cognizant of the inverse relationship between national economic effectiveness 
and growing globalization, small economies can have power in an increasingly global world 
only if they act collectively. The study undermines this argument by questioning the capacity 
of institutions as instruments of regional governance to shield their members’ economies or 
respond effectively to external or internal shocks. Systemic crises affect economies in very 
different ways. Solutions drawn on experience to deal with a set of problems in one economy 
cannot be transferred to another and be expected to work reasonably well. Global crises 
trigger national crises which may in turn exacerbate regional crises. This reverberation of 
problems across layers of governance complicates diagnosis and response. Democratic 
accountability focuses national attention to domestic problems, while international investors 
demand solutions that may cut across sovereign boundaries. Regional institutional changes 
aiming to deal with such contradictions must link these two levels in positive-sum rather than 
zero-sum ways. Addressing problems at one level should not be at the expense of creating 
problems at a different level. Regional governance is both the solution and the problem in 
periods of crisis. In the absence of a democratic, federal Europe, the answer to its financial 
crisis may not be more rule-based governance but more flexible institutional innovation.
                                                           
1
  
